Alan Alsop: 21/11(2).Normally with doubles there are a number of alternatives. This no exception. The one approach I like to try keep away from is separating too many men without support especially with big numbers. Although not always achievable. Making the 3 pt certainly will worry White, but Blue still has to bring three men home from Whites homeboard. Blue can certainly play around with these numbers. But the rule says when in the lead run. The one man back is not a major problem and Blue is covering the 5 pt if he runs the back men all the way, and if White fails to enter then he can hit and will be in a very strong position.
Chuck Bower: 21/11(2).
I don't like the 8-point because of its inefficiency with the alreadymade 2-point, and 13/3(2) divides Blue's army. Then it gets tough.I've waffled for several days between three plays: 23/13, 21/16(2);21/11(2); and 23/13, 21/11. The first of these gets moving cleanlybut doesn't pressure White's blot on Blue's 5-point. 21/11(2)does that but leaves the back blot stranded. 23/13, 21/11 addressesthe weaknesses of the other two plays but leaves Blue wide open tosome lucky rolling by White.
The next battlefield is either Blue's homeboard (if White doesn'tanchor on Blue's 5-point) or Blue's outfield. Blue wants a headstart in that fight so 23/13, 21/16(2) is out. 23/13, 21/11doesn't feel right. You get a good roll and you end up with fewerpoints and more blots. White's awkward entering 6's (especially1-6 and 3-6) become good rolls.
21/11(2) wins by process of elimination. That back checker may notbe so hard to get moving, and until that happens it adds some perilto White's homeboard slots.
Nigel Buchan: 13/3(2).
Just got to stop White making my 5pt, the only way I can see of doing this is to make my 3pt. I won't like it much if he does, but the 3pt is the 3pt and it will help me later if not now.
Neil Kazaross: 13/3(2).
Many options here, but I'm going for the throat with 13-3(2) which takesaway 4 numbers that make our 5 point for White. This can leave us scrambling if White enters with a 5, but he still has only a 1 point board to our 4 points and will lose many G's if he dances and we then win the fight for our 5 point.George Klitsas: 13/3(2).
An extremely difficult and rather infrequent position. A play like 21/16(2) 13/8(2) would lead to problems (especially if White enters conveniently) of bringing the position home (between many awkward rolls, how Blue would play a 6-5 or a 4-2 for example?). 21/11(2), perhaps a better play, encounters fewer such problems but does not totally avoid them. Committal as it might look, making the fourth inner point with 13/3(2) looks like the winner here. With a little luck, Blue might even force White into an ace point game. This is not exactly an argument but if one plays 13/8(2) and starts thinking about how to play the other two 5's, nine out of ten times he will blame himself for making two moves with his fingers (stopping for a second or two on the eight point) instead of one.
Hannu Lyyjynen: 13/3(2).
The three point has to be made now, alternatives look much weaker.
Snowie: 13/3(2).
White is on the bar, and there is a big difference between a three-pointboard and a four-point board. If White doesn't roll an immediate five, Iwill have a good chance to attack on my five point and reduce him to anace point game. There is no need to move my back checkers -- they aren'tgoing to be hemmed in.
Marty Storer: 13/3(2).
This makes a nice broken prime, improves the board, keeps White off the 3 point forever, and gives best gammon chances. I can't see anything coming close to that. Blue should gladly pay off to 44 next time.
Bob Stringer: 21/11(2).
Grabbing the 3 point grabs the eye right away, but if it doesn'twork. I've got 3 back men 3 quadrants of the board away fromvirtually everyone else. Since it gives me a 4 point to a onepoint board, it is still very tempting, but if White anchors onthe 5 point the game is still wide open (although I think I'dstill have the advantage). 21/11(2) tries to bring everyone aroundtogether, and although maybe that's being unduly cautious, sinceI'm having trouble assessing the potential for things going wrongafter making the 3 point, it's my choice.
Casper van der Tak: 13/3(2).
Another point. Cases can be made for moving the back checkers out in whatever combination; this would be based on connectivity arguments. These plays are OK, but I like the simple approach of filling in the board, and then attacking on the 5, build a 5-prime, and run around the board. The strong board will also help in bringing the back checkers around should this plan fail; White will not be anxious to leave many shots while containing Blue.
Kit Woolsey: 21/11(2).
Making the three point will be nice if that causes White to flunk, but if Whiteenters my army will be divided in two. I think it is better to consolidatemy forces and go after my five point. The best way to do this appears tobe to make the 11 point. This escapes two of the three back checkers andbrings them right into firing range. My remaining back checker shouldn'thave too much difficult finding its way home.
Chris Yep: 21/11(2).
Blue has to balance the blitz with creating a solid position in the cases where his blitz fails. For example 23/13 21/16(2) doesn't bring any new checkers into the attacking zone and is too passive in my opinion. 13/3(2) is definitely a strong candidate since it secures a 4-point board. However it leaves 3 stranded back men and if White enters with a 5, Blue will have over-run the position. I prefer 21/11(2), which has several advantages. First it escapes two back men. Second it gives Blue 3 builders aiming at the important 5 point. Although it doesn't make the 3 point, Blue will still be able to continue the attack if White enters there. On the other hand if White enters on the 5 point, Blue will be better able to recover.
In a very close vote, tactics won out over positional play as making thatfourth inner board point prevailed. None of the other candidates were evenin the picture. I still don't have any feel for which play is better.
